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WORKING PAPER
What’s Ahead for Power Plants and Industry?
Using the Clean Air Act to Reduce Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, Building on Existing Regional Programs
Franz T. Litz, Nicholas M. Bianco, Michael B. Gerrard, and Gregory E. Wannier
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In the absence of congressional action on climate change, all eyes are on
the states and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
see how they will regulate greenhouse gas emissions from existing large
power plants and industrial facilities. Indeed, power plants and industrial
facilities are the sources of half of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions,
making those plants and facilities central to any effort to reduce the
country’s total emissions.1 This working paper explores a promising
pathway for the states and EPA to make these reductions using the standards of performance under section 111 of the Clean Air Act.
EPA has announced that it will begin the process for regulating power plants
and refineries under section 111.2 EPA has scheduled listening sessions with
stakeholders and intends to issue draft performance standards for new and
modified power plants by July 26, 2011, and at the same time issue to the
states a draft mandatory guideline that requires states to develop plans to
impose performance standards on existing power plants. The final performance standards and mandatory guidelines are expected in May 2012. The
process for refineries will lag behind that for the electricity sector by about
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Research Fellow at the Center for Climate Change Law.
In the proceedings of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the
Obama administration has committed the United States to a 17 percent reduction below
2005 levels by 2020. It is unlikely that the country can meet this commitment without
significant reductions from the power and industry sectors.
2. See http://www.epa.gov/airquality/pdfs/settlementfactsheet.pdf.
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six months, with draft rules to be issued in December 2011
and final rules expected in November 2012.
Like many other requirements of the Clean Air Act (the
Act), the standards of performance under section 111 are
designed and implemented through a federal-state partnership. EPA lists the categories of sources and establishes
performance standards for new and modified emitters
within listed categories. EPA also establishes a mandatory
“guideline” for states, creating a federal “floor” for
regulation of existing sources that applies only if the states
fail to set their own standards of performance that meet or
exceed this floor.3 This guideline includes possible
“system[s] of emission reduction” that the states may use
to set standards of performance. In promulgating these
plans, the states will have considerable flexibility, since the
standards of performance under section 111(d) may take
the form of traditional emissions rate limitations or any
number of other more flexible mechanisms. The emergence
of state cap-and-trade programs raises the question of
whether these cap-and-trade programs could be used to
meet a state’s obligations under section 111(d) of the Act.
The traditional approach to regulating power plant and
industrial facilities is through performance standards that
prescribe specific emissions limitations on individual
sources. This approach has been used for years to control
conventional pollutant emissions, and is the safest
approach from a legal defensibility standpoint. Because
many states have already begun regulating some existing
sources using cap and trade, the traditional approach may
not be the one preferred by the states or their stakeholders.
Indeed, states that have already chosen to reduce emissions
from power plants and industry using flexible, marketbased approaches, can be expected to develop plans calling
for alternatives to the traditional source-specific performance standards. EPA under George W. Bush concluded
that the Clean Air Act allows cap and trade as a demonstrated and effective form of regulation under Section

3. In specific cases, there are some exceptions to this “federal floor,” in
which the states may treat existing sources more leniently based on
the facts, which we briefly discuss later.

111(d), and the Obama EPA has not contested this interpretation. Until federal courts rule on this approach, however,
there will be some uncertainty about its viability.
The assumption that the states and many of their stakeholders will propose cap and trade under section 111(d) of the
Clean Air Act has led to a number of questions around
program design features, such as whether the Act allows
offsets, or trading across listed categories of sources and
whether the existing regional cap-and-trade program
designs would be acceptable to EPA under section 111(d).
Even though many of these issues are questions of first
impression and therefore cannot be answered with absolute
certainty, this paper explores the arguments for and against
specific cap-and-trade design features in the context of
section 111, including the implications for existing and
planned regional cap-and-trade programs.
Box 1 | Findings

This working paper examines the process for establishing
performance standards covering existing power plants and
industrial facilities in the United States and finds
1. Congress granted the EPA and the states considerable flexibility in determining how to cover existing power plants and
industrial facilities under section 111 of the Clean Air Act.
2. After lengthy collaboration with stakeholders, twenty-three
states designed and many implemented flexible, marketbased emissions-trading mechanisms to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from existing power plants and
industrial facilities.
3. The discretion afforded to states under the Clean Air Act
should permit them to propose a variety of policy mechanisms, including cap and trade.
4. The regional cap-and-trade designs present specific
opportunities and challenges when reconciling the designs
with section 111 of the act, including the following:
A.	Offsets cannot be used to meet federal minimum
reductions but may be allowed above and beyond federal
minimums.
B. Trading between regulated categories of sources depends
on the EPA’s interpretation of the act.
C. Borrowing and safety valve mechanisms are problematic
unless they can be designed to ensure minimum
reductions within federal time frames.

What’s Ahead for Power Plants and Industry?

I. Introduction
With action stalled in the U.S. Congress on climate change
legislation, the Obama Administration must look to its
existing legal and regulatory authorities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.4 A key authority is found in section 111
of the Clean Air Act, which provides for the establishment of
source categories and performance standards for new
pollution sources within those categories.5
Section 111(d) will be an important component of any
EPA-led effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions because
it offers one of the few mechanisms for regulating large
existing sources, such as existing power plants and
industrial sources.6 Indeed, power plants, industry, and
other source categories covered by section 111 regulation—such as large non-agricultural methane sources—
make up as much as 54 percent of the U.S. emissions
inventory.7 Although section 111(d) has been implemented
through traditional performance standards that impose an
emissions rate limitation on pollution sources, it is likely
that section 111 also would permit other less-traditional
regulatory approaches.
A number of U.S. states have chosen market-based
approaches to reduce emissions from power plants and
industrial pollution sources. Their choice was based on the
belief that such approaches yield greater emissions
4. At the 2009 Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen, President
Barack Obama committed the United States to a 17 percent reduction
of greenhouse gas emissions from 2005 levels by 2020. The Obama
administration is a party to the December 2010 Cancun Agreements,
which once again took note of the Copenhagen reduction pledges. See
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf.
5. Appendix A contains the full statutory text of section 111 of the Clean
Air Act.
6. Nicholas Bianco and Franz Litz, Reducing Greenhouse Gas
Emissions in the United States Using Existing Federal Authorities
and State Action, World Resources Institute, 2010; available at http://
www.wri.org/federalclimateaction; Nathan Richardson, Art Fraas
and Dallas Burtraw, Greenhouse Gas Regulation under the Clean
Air Act, Structure, effects and Implications of a Knowable Pathway,
Resources for the Future (April 2010); Franz T. Litz and Nicholas M.
Bianco, What to Expect from EPA: Regulation of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions under the Clean Air Act, Environmental Law Reporter 40
(May 2010):ELR 10480. Also see the discussion in section II.C.2.
7. Bianco and Litz, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions.
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reductions at a lower cost than do traditional performance
standards, which require all plants to implement the same
emissions limitation. Market-based mechanisms the view
goes, provide regulated entities an incentive to seek out
and pursue the lowest cost reduction opportunities.
EPA and the states have had little experience applying
section 111(d) because it pertains only to pollutants that are
neither criteria pollutants subject to National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS) nor hazardous air pollutants
under the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air

Figure 1 | Sources Amenable to Regulation Under Section
111 of the Clean Air Act
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Performance standards could cover up to 54 percent of U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions. The pie chart above depicts all U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions in 2008. Those sources amenable
to regulation under section 111 are colored blue. They include:
power plants, industry, and large non-agricultural methane
sources. Large non-agricultural methane sources include: landfills,
coal mines, natural gas and petroleum systems, and wastewater
treatment facilities.
Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2008,
430-R-10-006, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of
Atmospheric Programs, 15 Apr. 2010.
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Box 2 | Distinguishing Section 111 Performance Standards

from the Tailoring Rule and Preconstruction Permitting
It is important to distinguish the regulation of new, modified,
and existing sources through the “standards of performance”
under section 111 of the Clean Air Act—the subject of this
paper—from the preconstruction-permitting program under the
Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) provisions.
PSD calls for the installation of Best Available Control
Technology (BACT) in new and modified plants and does not
apply to existing facilities. The EPA’s “tailoring rule” and BACT
guidance document detail how the PSD/BACT preconstruction-permitting program will be implemented. New source
performance standards under section 111 of the Act will serve
as the “floor” for BACT determinations.

Pollutants (NESHAP) program.8 To date, EPA and the states
have regulated existing landfills, municipal waste combustors, sulfuric acid, phosphate fertilizer and pulp and paper
production facilities, petroleum refiners, and hospital/
medical/infectious waste incinerators under section 111(d)
for a variety of pollutants, but not for their greenhouse gas
emissions.9 In addition, EPA’s proposed Clean Air Mercury
Rule (CAMR) sought to use section 111(d) to implement cap
and trade at the state level. Even though CAMR was vacated
by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals for
reasons not related to whether cap and trade is permitted
under section 111,10 the discussion of CAMR’s design will
be useful in considering whether the designs of existing state
programs will be consistent with impending federal requirements.

8. EPA defined six criteria air pollutants under section 108(a) of
the Clean Air Act: particulate matter, ground-level ozone, carbon
monoxides, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and lead. When the Clean
Air Act was amended in 1990, Congress listed 188 toxic air pollutants
in section 112(b)(1) of the act. Because greenhouse gases (GHGs)
have not been designated as criteria pollutants under section 108, nor
listed as hazardous air pollutants under section 112, they qualify for
regulation under section 111(d).
9. See 40 CFR Part 60, Subparts CB (municipal combustors guideline);
CC (municipal landfills guideline); CD (sulfuric acid production
guideline); and CE (medical waste incinerators).
10. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

Although the experience with CAMR is helpful to understanding how a state might implement cap and trade to
reduce emissions under section 111(d), a number of
questions remain. CAMR involved a relatively simple
cap-and-trade system covering one discrete category of
sources. A review of the cap-and-trade program designs
reflected in three regional initiatives in North America
reveals greater complexity, particularly with respect to
offset provisions, intersectoral and international trading,
and safety valve mechanisms.
This working paper examines the feasibility of accommodating regional cap-and-trade programs in the implementation of section 111 for power plants and industrial facilities. Part II of the paper examines section 111 of the Act,
explains the respective roles of EPA and the states, and
discusses whether cap and trade is permissible under that
section of the Act. Part III provides an overview of
existing regional cap-and-trade programs. Part IV
addresses the challenges posed by section 111(d) when
attempting to reconcile it with the existing and potential
regional program designs. Part V looks at the possible
scenario in which EPA fails to proceed to regulate
emissions under section 111 for specific categories of
sources and addresses possible responses by states
seeking to push for additional action. Finally, part VI
concludes by describing a possible path forward for EPA
and the states under section 111 and the future of statelevel cap-and-trade programs in this context.

II. Covering New and Existing Sources
under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act
Section 111 of the Act gives EPA and the states certain legal
authorities and potential responsibilities to regulate sources
of harmful emissions, such as power plants, industrial
facilities, and other large stationary sources of greenhouse
gas emissions. This part of the paper explores section 111
generally to show how EPA lists emissions source categories
and establishes and implements standards for listed categories, as well as the potential roles states play in the listing of
categories and the implementation of these standards. In

What’s Ahead for Power Plants and Industry?

addition, this section examines the potential for state-level
cap-and-trade programs under section 111(d).

A. Summary of Section 111
Through section 111 of the Act, Congress granted EPA the
authority to regulate new and modified emissions sources
and to require that the states regulate existing sources in
the same categories for certain pollutants. The steps for
establishing standards of performance and regulating new
and modified stationary sources are discussed below in this
section.

1. EPA Administrator Determines Source Categories
Covered
The first step in regulating stationary sources of greenhouse gas emissions is for EPA to establish source
categories. Section 111(b) requires the EPA Administrator
(the Administrator) to create and periodically update a list
of emissions source categories that “in [the Administrator’s] judgment… causes, or contributes significantly to,
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare.”11 Because the statute
specifically allows the Administrator to distinguish
among “classes, types, and sizes within categories of new
sources” when establishing standards,12 the Act would
seem to allow fairly general source categories with any
number of subcategories.13

5

Box 3 | Excerpt of Section 111(b)

§111(b)(1)(A). The Administrator shall, within 90 days after
December 31, 1970, publish (and from time to time thereafter
shall revise) a list of categories of stationary sources. He shall
include a category of sources in such list if in his judgment it
causes, or contributes significantly to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare.
(B)Within one year after the inclusion of a category of
stationary sources in a list under subparagraph (A), the
Administrator shall publish proposed regulations, establishing
Federal standards of performance for new sources within such
category.

Most emissions sources that emit greenhouse gases are
already represented in the long list of source categories
EPA has designated, including power plants and many
industrial sectors.14 Some greenhouse gas emitters, such as
coal mines and natural gas distribution facilities, are not
currently regulated under section 111, however, but section
111(g) allows any governor to apply to EPA for the
designation of additional categories of sources. Upon a
sufficient showing, the EPA Administrator must list the
new category and establish performance standards. Thus
the states can request that additional categories be listed,
but they cannot define categories on their own. This
distinction is important to discussing the possible scope of
a state-level cap-and-trade program under section 111(d).15
Part 60 of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations
contains numerous subparts, each containing the standards
of performance for listed categories of emissions sources.
An example is subpart D, the Standards of Performance for

11. 42 U.S.C. section 4211(b). See text in box. Note that the
endangerment finding under section 111(b) hinges on EPA’s making
a determination that the category is a “significant” contributor to air
pollution. This requirement vests more discretion in the Administrator
than do the requirements under Title II of the Clean Air Act, which do
not have the “significant” qualifier. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA concerned the Title II endangerment finding.
12. 42 U.S.C. section 4211(b)(2).
13. This is an important consideration for establishing a cap-and-trade
program under section 111(d) for existing sources. EPA establishes
the category, and there is some doubt about permitting trading of
allowances across categories.

14. Some significant sources of emissions that have not yet been
designated as categories under section 111 include coal mines and
natural gas distribution systems.
15. Because EPA can revise the list of categories and has broad
discretion in what types of sources are combined within categories, it
theoretically could combine existing categories of sources into larger
categories. But based on the recent announcement that EPA will set
performance standards for greenhouse gas emissions from power
plants and refineries, this seems unlikely.
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Fossil Fuel–Fired Steam Generators for which Construction is Commenced after August 17, 1971.

2. EPA Sets Standards of Performance for New and
Modified Sources
In section 111(b)(1)(B), Congress gave EPA one year after
listing a source category to propose regulations to create
standards of performance for that category. A standard of
performance is an emissions limitation that is “achievable
through the application of the best system of emission
reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving
such reduction and any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator
determines has been adequately demonstrated.” This
definition has at least three key points. First, the standard is
an emissions standard that must reflect the application of
the “best system of emission reduction.” Second, cost must
be considered, along with health and environmental and
energy impacts. Third, either the “system of emission
reduction” must have been adequately demonstrated in
practice, or EPA must have a reasonable basis for assuming
that it will be adequately demonstrated within the established time frame for compliance.16

3. State Delegation for New and Modified Sources
While states have little role in issuing performance
standards for new and modified sources, they can receive
delegation to implement and enforce the standards promulgated by EPA. Under section 111(c), a state may submit a
procedure for implementing the new source performance
standards program, and if EPA determines that the procedure is adequate, then the Administrator must delegate the

Box 4 | Excerpt of Section 111(a)

§111(a)(1) provides: The term “standard of performance”
means a standard for emissions of air pollutants which
reflects the degree of emission limitation achievable through
the application of the best system of emission reduction which
(taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and
any nonair quality health and environmental impact and
energy requirements) the Administrator determines has been
adequately demonstrated.

program’s implementation to the state. Some states seek
and receive delegation to control the implementation of the
federal requirements within their borders. The federal
government retains concurrent authority to enforce the
standards even in delegated states.

B. Section 111(d) Performance Standards for Existing
Sources
Although most of the regulatory activity under section
111 has consisted of standards for new and modified
sources,17 a wide range of existing source categories of
greenhouse gas emissions may be regulated under section
111(d) of the Act. Section 111(d) has been used less often
because it applies only to pollutants, like greenhouse
gases, that are neither criteria pollutants nor hazardous air
pollutants.18 According to section 111(d), the states must
regulate the existing sources under federal oversight.19 If
a state fails to submit and implement an adequate plan to
regulate existing sources, then EPA must impose a federal
plan on that state.20
Congress referred to the State Implementation Plan (SIP)
process in section 111(d) when it called for the states to

16. An example of a standard of performance can be found at 40 CFR
Subpart D—the standards of performance applicable to new fossil
fuel–fired steam generators—applies to steam generators with a heat
input greater than 250 million British thermal units (MMBTUs). The
generator must meet an emissions rate for particulate matter, sulfur
dioxide, and nitrogen oxides. For particulate matter, the source must
not emit more than 0.10 pounds per MMBTUs of heat input. For
sulfur dioxide, the standard is 0.81 pounds per MMBtu for non-coalfired units and 1.20 pounds per MMBtu for coal units. For nitrogen
oxides, the standard varies from 0.20 pounds per MMBtu for gasfired units to 0.80 pounds per MMBtu for units firing certain types
of coal. Thus, the standards were set to differentiate among different
types of fossil fuel–fired steam generators.

17. See 40 CFR Part 60, Subparts D through KKKK.
18. Criteria pollutants are those for which EPA issues National Ambient
Air Quality Standards and designates attainment and nonattainment
areas. The states must then develop implementation plans that include
measures to prevent the deterioration of air quality in attainment areas
or to improve air quality to bring nonattainment areas into attainment.
Hazardous air pollutants are those listed under section 112 of the act.
19. 42 U.S.C. section 4211(d)(2).
20. Ibid.

What’s Ahead for Power Plants and Industry?
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Figure 2 | Regulatory Pathway for Section 111

States can petition EPA to develop
performance standards for new,
modified, and existing units under
section 111(g)
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section 111(b)
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units under section 111(b)

EPA sets guidelines for existing
units under section 111(d)

States work with stakeholders in
state implementation planning
process to develop regulations
consistent with guidelines

Either EPA implements standards
for new and modified units or
states apply for delegation under
section 111(c)

Either EPA accepts state proposal
and state implements standards
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EPA finds state proposal
unacceptable and implements a
Federal Implementation Plan (FIP)
under section 111(d)

If source violates standard either
state enforces and/or EPA
enforces using section 111(e)

draw up plans to cover existing sources of emissions. The
SIP process grants the states a great deal of discretion in
deciding how to regulate emissions sources within their
territories, which may include the use of market-based
mechanisms. Thus, it may be inferred that Congress
intended to give the states a great deal of flexibility in
carrying out the dictates of section 111(d).

approving the states’ plans for regulating existing sources
under section 111(d).21 The process begins with EPA’s
issuing emissions guidelines for the states to use in
developing plans for covering existing sources within the
same categories that EPA established under section
111(b).22 Very often, EPA issues these emissions guidelines
for the states at the same time that it issues or updates the

As required by section 111(d)(1) of the Act, EPA has issued
regulations that prescribe the procedure for submitting and

21. 42 U.S.C. section 4211(d)(1); 40 CFR Part 60, Subpart B.
22. 42 U.S.C. section 4211(d)(1); 40 CFR §60.22.
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Box 5 | Possible Regulatory Mechanisms Fitting Definition of

“Standard of Performance”
Although this paper focuses mostly on the potential for cap
and trade under section 111(d), the Act’s broad definition of
“standard of performance” may permit many other regulatory
mechanisms, such as
•	Emissions rates applicable to all sources within a category,
whether based on emissions per unit of output or per unit
of heat input.
•	An emissions rate-based trading program that prescribes an
emissions rate but allows trading of allowances among
sources to achieve the established rate.
•	A system that sets lifetime emissions limits (tons of CO2) for
regulated sources and permits trading of these limits
between sources.
•	An allowance system that provides for the retirement over
time of existing plants.

new source performance standard under section 111(b) of
the Act. With the emissions guidelines in hand, states then
develop plans for covering their existing sources. In
developing those plans, states are permitted to consider
“among other factors, the remaining useful life of the
existing source to which such standard applies,” thereby
permitting more flexible standards for existing units under
111(d) than those established for new units under 111(b).23

1. The Issue of National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS)
Section 111 allows EPA and the states to issue standards of
performance for existing sources only for those pollutants
that have not been listed as criteria pollutants for which
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) are to
be set and for hazardous air pollutants under the Act. Both
the Bush and Obama Administration EPAs have taken the
position that establishment of NAAQS for greenhouse gas

emissions is neither required nor desirable.24 Similarly,
neither administration has sought to list greenhouse gases
as hazardous pollutants. If, for any reason, EPA were to list
greenhouse gases as criteria pollutants or hazardous
pollutants, then the section 111(d) pathway described in
this paper would not be available to EPA and the states.
Although two successive administrations have concluded
that NAAQS are inappropriate for greenhouse gas emissions, some argue that EPA may have no choice but to
designate greenhouse gases as criteria pollutants under
section 108 of the Act.25 The NAAQS path would result in
the need for state implementation plans to protect and
improve air quality.26 This view is based on the observation
that the endangerment finding that leads to listing criteria
pollutants in section 108 of the Act is identical to the
endangerment finding that EPA already has made under
Title II of the Act.27
EPA has two statutory arguments to counter this contention. First, the terms of section 108 are permissive: EPA is
not required to list a pollutant and to issue a NAAQS for
each and every pollutant found to endanger public health
and welfare. Instead, a plain reading of the statute limits
the pollutants that must be listed to those “for which [the
Administrator] plans to issue air quality criteria.”28 A
second and more structural argument is that the interpretation of section 108 to compel the listing of greenhouse
gases as criteria pollutants would render meaningless

24. Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Regulating Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44354, 4447644520 (2008). The Obama EPA has not distanced itself from the
statement that EPA does not intend to list greenhouse gases under
section 108 of the Act. In addition, EPA’s recent announcement to
regulate existing sources of greenhouse gases under section 111(d) is
a de facto continuation of this position. http://www.epa.gov/airquality/
pdfs/settlementfactsheet.pdf.
25. Nathan Richardson, Greenhouse Gas Regulation under the Clean
Air Act: Does Chevron v. NRDC Set the EPA Free? RFF Discussion
Paper 09-50 (December 2009); available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/
Documents/RFF-DP-09-50.pdf.
26. 42 U.S.C. §§7408–10; 74 Fed. Reg. 55292, 55297 (October 27,
2009).
27. See http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment.html.

23. (italics added).

28. 42 U.S.C. §7408(a)(1)(C).

What’s Ahead for Power Plants and Industry?

section 111(d) of the Act. Section 111(d)(1)(A) has two
requirements for applicability. The first is that it applies
only to a pollutant “for which air quality criteria have not
been issued or which is not included on a list published
under section [108(a)].” The second is that it applies only
when section 111(b) applies.29 Section 111(b)(1)(A),
however, says that 111(b) itself must be triggered by an
endangerment finding.30 If every endangerment finding
were to mandate listing under section 108, this area of the
statute would be rendered meaningless. Thus the language
governing the applicability of 111(d) seems to have
contemplated that some pollutants would endanger the
public health and welfare but never become criteria
pollutants under section 108(a).31

2. The Process for the State Implementation Plan (SIP)
Congress called for a SIP-like process in covering existing
sources under section 111(d): “The Administrator shall
prescribe regulations which shall establish a procedure
similar to that provided by section [110] of this title under
which each State shall submit to the Administrator a plan.”
Section 110 pertains generally to state plans to attain
National Ambient Air Quality Standards or, if a state is
already in attainment, to prevent a significant deterioration
of air quality in the state. Section 110(a)(2)(A) of the Act
lists the broad array of policy mechanisms allowed in a
state’s SIP:
Each such plan shall—

29. 42 U.S.C. §7411(d)(1)(A).
30. 42 U.S.C. §7411(b)(1)(A).
31. Note that the states’ discretion to implement the regulatory
mechanisms of their choice probably grows only if NAAQS are
established for greenhouse gases. The states’ implementationplanning process under section 110 of the Act provides for a great
deal of flexibility in finding ways to preserve and improve air quality.
Cap-and-trade programs have been considered approvable parts of
the states’ implementation plans for other pollutants. New York, for
example, implemented a state-level cap-and-trade program to reduce
non-ozone-season NOx emissions in the state. See http://www.
dec.ny.gov/regulations/64111.html. In addition, the NOx SIP Call
program covering power plants and industrial boilers was a cap-andtrade program created in response to ozone transport concerns. See
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progsregs/nox/otc.html.
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(A) include enforceable emission limitations and other
control measures, means, or techniques (including
economic incentives such as fees, marketable permits,
and auctions of emissions rights), as well as schedules
and timetables for compliance, as may be necessary or
appropriate to meet the applicable requirements of this
chapter. (italics added)
The reference in section 111(d) to the section 110 SIP
process tends to support substantial state discretion in
selecting the appropriate “standard of performance”
mechanism for existing sources. It also supports the use of
market-based mechanisms.

3. EPA’s Emissions Guidelines for Section 111(d)
According to 40 CFR section 60.22, the EPA emissions
guidelines must contain the following:
a. Information concerning known or suspected
endangerment of public health or welfare caused, or
contributed to, by the designated pollutant.32
b. A description of systems of emission reduction that,
in the judgment of the EPA Administrator, have been
adequately demonstrated.
c. Information about the degree of emission reduction
that is achievable with each system, together with
information about the costs and environmental effects
of applying each system to designated facilities.
d. Incremental periods of time normally expected to be
necessary for the design, installation, and start-up of
identified control systems.
e. An emission guideline that reflects the application of
the best system of emission reduction (considering the
cost of such reduction) that has been adequately
demonstrated for designated facilities, and the time
within which compliance with emission standards of
equivalent stringency can be achieved. The Administrator will specify different emission guidelines or
32. Section 60.22. Note that this is not a requirement for a new
endangerment finding but a place to recite the impacts of the
emissions to be regulated.
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compliance times or both for the different sizes, types,
and classes of designated facilities when costs of
control, physical limitations, geographical location, or
similar factors make subcategorization appropriate.
f. Other available information as the Administrator
determines may contribute to the formulation of the
states’ plans.
These guidelines must be issued initially in draft form, in
order to permit public review and comment.33 This draft
may be issued when or after a performance standard is
proposed under section 111(b). EPA will revise the
guidelines in accordance with the comments it receives and
then will issue the guidelines in final. EPA has issued
guidelines under section 111(d) for the following categories of sources: municipal waste combustors, municipal
solid waste landfills, sulfuric acid production facilities,
kraft pulp mills, primary aluminum reduction plants,
phosphate fertilizer plants, and hospital/medical/infectious
waste incinerators.34

4. State Plans under the Section 111(d) Procedure
Within nine months after EPA issues its final emissions
guidelines, EPA’s regulations require the states to adopt
and submit their plans for covering existing sources,
although EPA may specify a different time period for
submission.35 Each state must hold at least one public
hearing before adopting and submitting its plan to EPA.36
EPA regulations specify that the state plan must have the
following contents:37
a. Emissions standards. Each plan must include
emission standards and compliance schedules. The

33. 40 CFR §60.22(a). The regulations do not specify time periods for
this review and comment.
34. 40 CFR Part 60, Subparts Cb through Ce; 40 CFR Part 62.

emission standards must prescribe “allowable rates of
emissions” except when clearly impracticable.38
b. Measurement, monitoring, reporting, and record
keeping. The state plan must contain provisions for
emissions test methods, monitoring, reporting, and
compliance verification.
c. Coverage. The state plan must cover all existing
facilities that would be subject to the new source
performance standards if they were new or modified
existing sources.39
d. Inventory. Each plan must contain the inventory of
existing emissions sources in the state.
e. Legal authority. Each plan must demonstrate that the
state has the legal authority to implement and enforce
the plan.
The state plan must contain emissions standards that are
“no less stringent” than those contained in the federal
guidelines.40 Similarly, compliance times in the state plan
must be expeditious and no later than the compliance times
in the federal guidelines.41 With the exception of these
requirements, both the statutory text and the regulatory
procedure for implementing the plan requirement appear to
allow states to propose alternative approaches to EPA’s
guidelines.

38. The CAMR rule making sought to add the words “allowance system”
alongside the terms “allowable rates of emissions” in the 40 CFR Part
60, Subpart B regulations, but this addition was vacated when the
D.C. Circuit vacated the entire CAMR rule making. See New Jersey
vs. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
39. The regulations refer to such exiting facilities as “designated
facilities.” Section 60.21(b) provides that “designated facility means
any existing facility (see §60.2(aa)) which emits a designated
pollutant and which would be subject to a standard of performance
for that pollutant if the existing facility were an affected facility (see
§60.2(e)).”

36. 40 CFR §60.23(c)(1). Notice requirements also are specified in the
regulations. See 40 CFR §60.23(d).

40. 40 CFR §60.24(c). Note that EPA’s rules have a provision that under
specific circumstances such as high cost or physical impossibility,
the states may impose less stringent requirements on sources. See 40
CFR §60.24(f).

37. 40 CFR §§60.24 to 60.26.

41. Ibid.

35. 40 CFR §60.23(a)(1).
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5. EPA Action on State Plans
In its section 111(d) regulations, EPA gives itself four
months to approve or disapprove of state plans. Upon
approval of the plan, it is incorporated into the federal
regulations at 40 CFR part 62. If a state fails to submit a
plan or EPA finds a state’s plan inadequate, EPA must
impose a federal plan on the state.42 EPA’s regulations
require that this federal plan be promulgated within six
months of the date the state plan submission was due.

C. The Potential for Cap and Trade under Section 111(d)
EPA has previously interpreted section 111 to allow cap
and trade as a “standard of performance” within the
meaning of section 111(a)(1) of the Act, although this interpretation was contested in a legal challenge to the Clean
Air Mercury Rule (CAMR).43 The Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals never decided the legal challenge to the CAMR
cap-and-trade program and instead vacated CAMR on
other grounds.44 EPA’s Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPR) on greenhouse gas regulations issued
in July 2008 also stated that cap and trade is a permissible
option for regulation under section 111(d).45
The current EPA has neither endorsed nor disavowed the
previous administration’s interpretation of the Act to allow
cap and trade. The statutory context for this position is
examined below, followed by a discussion of the importance of the deference afforded to EPA in interpreting the
Act. The Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR) provides an
example of how section 111(d) cap and trade under the
Clean Air Act might play out.

1. The Statutory Language
Section 111 does not expressly provide for the states’
establishment of a cap-and-trade program under section
42. 42 U.S.C. section 4211(d)(2). 40 CFR §60.27(c).
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111(d), although it does refer to the SIP-like process that
incorporates a variety of different regulatory mechanisms,
including market-based mechanisms.46 Instead, the section
calls for each state to submit a plan that establishes
“standards of performance” for “any existing source for
any air pollutant” that is neither a criteria pollutant nor a
hazardous air pollutant.47 The definition of “standard of
performance” appears to allow cap and trade if it is
reasonably considered a “system of emissions reduction”:
The term “standard of performance” means a standard
for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the
degree of emission limitation achievable through the
application of the best system of emission reduction
which (taking into account the cost of achieving such
reduction and any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.48
EPA interpreted the statutory language to define “emissions
standard” as follows in its regulations implementing
section 111(d): “Emissions standard means a legally
enforceable regulation setting forth an allowable rate of
emissions into the atmosphere, [establishing an allowance
system,] or prescribing equipment specifications for control
of air pollution emissions.” The bracketed phrase “establishing an allowance system” was vacated along with the
CAMR rule for reasons unrelated to the legality of cap and
trade under section 111. The following definition of “allowance system” also was vacated:
Allowance system means a control program under
which the owner or operator of each designated
facility is required to hold an authorization for each
specified unit of a designated pollutant emitted from
that facility during a specified period and which limits

43. Note that under the Clinton administration, the EPA general counsel
stated in a memorandum that the “EPA has long held the view that
trading across plant boundaries is impermissible under sections 111
and 112.” See http://www.law.umaryland.edu/environment/casebook/
documents/EPACO2memo1.pdf.

46. One could argue that the reference to section 110 of the act in section
111(d) incorporates the language found in section 110(a)(2)(A), which
expressly allows “economic incentives such as fees, marketable
permits, and auctions of emissions rights.” The reference to section
110, however, is to a “procedure similar to that provided by section
[110]” rather than to the substantive provisions of section 110.

44. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

47. 42 U.S.C. Section 7411(d)(1)(a).

45. 40 CFR 60.21, .24; 73 Fed. Reg. 44487 (July 30, 2008).

48. 42 U.S.C. Section 7411(a)(1) (italics added).
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the total amount of such authorizations available to be
held for a designated pollutant for a specified period
and allows the transfer of such authorizations not used
to meet the authorization-holding requirement.
Even though this rule language was vacated along with the
CAMR rule for other reasons, it represents an interpretation that EPA considered reasonable at the time. The
current EPA has neither officially endorsed nor disavowed
this interpretation, and no federal court has passed on its
legal merit.49
Another statutory provision in section 111(d) suggests that
the states should have more flexibility in establishing
standards of performance for existing sources than EPA has
in establishing new source performance standards under
section 111(b). Section 111(d)(1)(B) provides that EPA
“shall permit the State in applying a standard of performance to any particular source under a plan submitted
under this paragraph to take into consideration, among
other factors, the remaining useful life of the existing
source to which such standard applies” (italics added).
Because Congress expressly allowed states to take into
account the remaining useful life of existing sources when
devising their plans for regulating existing sources, it may
be argued that Congress intended section 111(d) regulation
to incorporate greater flexibility than the once-size-fits-all
approach found in section 111(b).
Notwithstanding the strong statutory arguments in favor of
regulatory flexibility, including cap and trade, the congressional silence on cap and trade in section 111 offers a
counterargument to those favoring a traditional emissions
rate–based performance standard. Title IV of the Clean Air
Act and section 110(a)(2)(A) contain express provisions
for flexible market-based mechanisms, both added in the
1990 amendments to the act. As this counter argument
goes, if Congress had intended to allow such mechanisms

49. In the CAMR litigation, the court explicitly declined to consider
any legal arguments beyond EPA’s faulty delisting of coal- and oilfired power plants. See NJ v. EPA, 517 F.3d at 584 (“In view of our
disposition, the court does not reach other contentions of petitioners
or intervenors”).

under section 111, it would have expressly provided for
them. Importantly, however, Congress referred to section
110 in section 111(d) (when it referenced section 110’s
SIP-like process). It may be argued that there was no need
to refer expressly to specific regulatory mechanisms in
section 111(d) because the reference to section 110
signaled Congress’s intent to allow the states a broad array
of options, including market-based mechanisms, as listed
in section 110(a)(2)(A).

2. The Deference Granted to EPA: The Chevron Decision
Because cap and trade is not expressly authorized in
section 111 of the Act, some interpretation of the provision
is required to reach the conclusion that the states may
indeed use cap and trade to reduce emissions from existing
power plants and industrial sources under section 111(d).
As previously noted, EPA has interpreted the Act in the
past to allow for cap and trade under section 111. Assuming that EPA sticks to this past interpretation, the question
is whether its interpretation deserves deference under the
Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council.50 In Chevron, the Court established the
following two-pronged test:
l

If Congress has expressed its intent unambiguously in
the statute, then the Agency and the Court must adhere to
that intent.

l

If, however, the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific question, the issue for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
interpretation of the Act.51

Since section 111 of the Act does not specifically address
whether cap and trade is properly considered a “standard of
performance,” the statute may be considered silent on the
issue. Even if some elements of section 111, or other parts
of the statute, introduce some ambiguity around the
question, the Chevron decision calls for deference to EPA’s
interpretation in the face of such ambiguity.

50. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
51. Ibid.
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One counterargument to this paper’s analysis might be the
Supreme Court’s assertion on matters of statutory interpretation that “Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental
details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions—It does not, one might say, hide elephants in
mouseholes.”52 This argument is a rebuff to pure textual
analysis and shows a general hostility to drawing out large
regulatory programs from small pieces of statutory text.
Nonetheless, this argument does not apply convincingly in
this context. The doctrine was first applied to reject
assertions that an “adequate margin of safety” included
cost considerations because of the term “adequate
margin.”53 In contrast, the regulatory policy here builds off
a full section of the statute, entire sections of which are
purposefully vague and explicitly grant EPA discretion in
implementing them. Thus EPA may fairly contend that the
argument for Chevron deference builds in many ways off
the explicit authority to pursue its judgment under the
statute, and not from mere textual manipulation.
Even though the deferential standard embodied in Chevron
tends to support EPA’s interpretation of the Act to allow
cap and trade, until the question is ultimately decided by
the federal courts, uncertainty on the question will remain.
Beyond the “big” question of whether cap and trade is
allowed are a number of questions relating to whether
specific cap-and-trade design features are allowed under
section 111(d). These questions are addressed in Part IV of
this paper.

3. The Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR) Example and the
Arguments against Cap and Trade under Section
111(d)
a. CAMR
With the Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR), EPA sought to
encourage states to implement cap and trade under section
111(d) to reduce mercury emissions from coal- and
oil-burning power plants. Because EPA had previously
decided to regulate mercury emissions from coal- and
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oil-fired power plants under section 112 of the Act,
mercury emissions from these plants initially were ineligible for regulation under section 111(d).54 EPA first had to
remove coal- and oil-fired power plants from the section
112 list and, at the same time, issue a new source performance standard covering mercury and guidelines for the
states for regulating mercury under section 111(d). EPA’s
guidelines thus included a model rule for a state-based
cap-and-trade program covering mercury emissions from
coal-burning power plants.55
The design of the model CAMR cap-and-trade program
was simple.56 It covered one portion of the electric generation sector: coal-fired electric steam generating or combustion turbine units serving electric generators with a
nameplate capacity of 25 MW or more. It established
simple allowance budgets and allowed the states to allocate
allowances at their discretion. The design contained no
cost-containment mechanism, no offsets, and no international trading of allowances.
On challenge, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals threw out
the CAMR rule on the grounds that EPA had improperly
removed power plants from the hazardous pollutant
category list. Although the challengers also argued that cap
and trade was not allowed under section 111(d), the court
did not reach this question.57

b. Arguments against Cap and Trade in the CAMR
Case
Some states and environmental challengers sought to have
CAMR tossed out, primarily on the grounds that EPA
improperly removed mercury-emitting coal- and oil-emitting power plants from the hazardous pollutant emitter list.
In contrast, petitioners raised three additional arguments in

54. See 42 U.S.C. 7411(d)(1)(A).
55. 40 CFR Part 60, Subpart HHHH.

52. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).

56. Ibid.

53. Ibid., 468–69.

57. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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their briefs over the legitimacy of cap and trade under
section 111:58
1. The petitioners argued that section 111(d) refers to
the issuance of standards of performance applicable to
“any existing source,” meaning that the standards must
require the same emissions rate at each and every unit.
In response, EPA contended that “any existing source”
means any and all sources within the category, a
condition satisfied by the cap-and-trade program.
2. The petitioners argued that even though “standard of
performance” is defined broadly in section 111(a) of
the Act to refer to a “system of emission reduction,”
the terms are defined in section 302 as “a requirement
of continuous emission reduction, including any
requirement relating to the operation or maintenance
of a source to assure continuous emission reduction.”
In response, EPA pointed out that the definition in
section 111(a) governs the use of the terms in the
section 111 context, and not the definitions in section
302. The agency contended further that even if the
section 302(l) definition did apply, a cap-and-trade
program would meet the requirement of “continuous
emissions reduction.”
3. The petitioners contended that the decision in
ASARCO v. EPA prevents trading among sources
subject to a standard of performance under section
111. The ASARCO case involved a source that sought
to avoid compliance with a new source performance
standard under section 111(b) by improving the
emissions performance at another emissions point in
the same facility. In response to this claim, EPA argued
that ASARCO had been overturned by the subsequent
decision in Chevron v. NRDC.59 It also contended that
to the extent ASARCO is still good law, it applies only
to emissions performance standards for new sources
under section 111(b), not to the more flexible standardsetting process for existing units embodied in section
111(d). Section 111(d) refers to the state implementa58. See EPA’s Appellate Brief, 2007 WL 2155494 (C.A.D.C.).
59. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

tion plan process under section 111 of the Act, which
vests a great deal of discretion in the states to devise
regulatory mechanisms.

4. Conclusion on Cap and Trade under Section 111(d)
Because the Circuit Court of Appeals in the CAMR case
never reached the arguments on cap and trade under
section 111(d), whether EPA would have prevailed in its
interpretation of the Act to allow cap and trade is not
known. But given the deference afforded EPA in interpreting ambiguity in the statute under Chevron, as well as the
strength of the agency’s other arguments, it seems likely
that EPA would have prevailed in any determination to
allow cap and trade under section 111(d).

III.	State-Level Cap-and-Trade Programs
Assuming that cap and trade is permitted under section
111(d), the question then is what that cap-and-trade
program may look like. This part of the paper examines the
cap-and-trade program designs developed in the regions of
North America, and part IV looks at the design elements
against the backdrop of section 111(d).
Twenty-three U.S. states have actively participated in the
design and/or implementation of three regional cap-andtrade programs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The
first of the three programs, the northeastern and mid-Atlantic Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which
covers CO2 emissions from large power plants, was
launched in January 2009. RGGI was followed by the
Western Climate Initiative (WCI) and the Midwestern
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (Midwestern Accord),
both of which are economy-wide programs designed for
implementation in 2012.
Currently, all ten of the RGGI states are implementing this
program, and both the Midwestern Accord and Western
Climate Initiative jurisdictions have completed their
regional designs. Of the states engaged in these latter two
initiatives, only New Mexico and California have promulgated regulations to implement the cap-and-trade program.
But because the gubernatorial administrations of many of
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the states in these programs currently are changing, the
likelihood of implementation in additional states is
uncertain.
Notwithstanding the uncertainty of implementation in the
midwestern and some western states, the cap-and-trade
designs are region specific, based on substantial stakeholder input. Even the designs of those states that have not
implemented cap and trade provide a good sense of the
kinds of choices that they would make if they chose cap
and trade as a mechanism to meet their section 111
obligations.

A. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
RGGI is the United States’ first cap-and-trade program for
greenhouse gases, and it covers ten northeastern and

mid-Atlantic states: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The program caps
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from large fossil fuel–fired
electric generating units, with the goal of stabilizing
emissions from 2009 through 2014 at a level roughly
equivalent to recent historical emissions. The program then
will reduce the cap by 2.5 percent per year over the next
four years to reduce the baseline in 2018 by 10 percent.
The RGGI states held their first auction for allowances on
September 25, 2008, and began regulating CO2 emissions
on January 1, 2009.60 But owing to an unexpected decline
in natural gas prices, greater nonfossil generation of power
(hydroelectric, wind, and nuclear), and the economic
60. RGGI Fact Sheet, available at http://rggi.org/docs/RGGI_
Executive%20Summary_4.22.09.pdf.

Figure 3 | Regional Cap-and-Trade Programs
U.S. GHG Emissions in 2007
(excludes land use change)
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Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT US) Version 4.0. (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2011).
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downturn, RGGI currently is issuing more allowances than
it has emissions from covered sources. In fact, emissions in
2009 fell 34 percent below the RGGI cap.61 As a result,
allowance auction prices have fallen to the floor price.
When the participating governors signed an MOU creating
RGGI in December 2005, they agreed to review the full
program in 2012. The RGGI states now are preparing for
that review, which will present an opportunity to make
corrections in RGGI’s course, including tightening its
emissions cap. The program review also makes it possible
to make any adjustments necessary to bring the program in
line with section 111’s requirements for power plants
determined by EPA.

B. The Western Climate Initiative
The Western Climate Initiative (WCI) is the most international of the three regional initiatives, with seven U.S.
states—Arizona, California, Montana, New Mexico,
Oregon, Utah, and Washington—and four Canadian
provinces—British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and
Quebec—participating. WCI also has six Mexican states as
observers, along with six more U.S. states and four more
Canadian provinces. The program has a 2012 start date.
For the first three years, approximately one-half the
regions’ emissions will be covered as it will include
electric generation, industrial combustion at large sources,
and industrial process emissions. In 2015, the program’s
scope will expand to cover nearly 90 percent of the
region’s emissions when it includes the remaining residential, commercial, and industrial combustion fuels. If all the
program’s members implement the program on schedule,
regional emissions will fall 15 percent below 2005 levels
by 2020. But because each jurisdiction has established a
separate reduction target, the actual regional reductions
will depend on which jurisdictions actually implement the
cap-and-trade program. For example, Utah has committed
to reducing emissions to 2005 levels by 2020, and Oregon
has committed to reducing emissions to 10 percent below

61. See RGGI Emissions Trends, Environment Northeast (June 2010), at
http://www.env-ne.org/public/resources/pdf/ENE_RGGI_Emissions_
Report_20100617_FINAL.pdf.

1990 levels by 2020. In addition, whereas many of the
Canadian members have made important strides toward
implementing the WCI program, the U.S. states currently
lag behind schedule, as only California and New Mexico
have begun to implement the WCI program.

C. The Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord
The Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (the
Midwestern Accord) covers six U.S. states—Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin—and one
Canadian province, Manitoba.62 Observers include Indiana,
Ohio, South Dakota, and the province of Ontario. The
program’s scope is comparable to that of the WCI program,
but its start date has not yet been set. The Midwestern
Accord establishes for all members a single greenhouse gas
reduction target of 18 to 20 percent below 2005 levels by
2020. The Midwestern Accord was negotiated by an
advisory group appointed by the member jurisdictions and
that was composed of industrial and environmental stakeholders, which suggests that there is regional support for
this particular design. Even though no jurisdiction has
proposed the Midwestern Accord program for adoption, and
recent elections in many of the states make its adoption less
likely, the program represents an important statement by the
region’s state officials and stakeholders.

D. Comparing the Program Designs
Because they represent a mix of policy decisions made to
enable action, the regional programs can help lead to
additional reductions. Accordingly, preservation of these
programs will make it easier for the member states to exceed
the federal requirements. If they are to avoid double
regulation,63 however, the states must demonstrate that their
programs are consistent with the statutory limitations of
section 111. To do this, they must show that their cap-andtrade program will achieve a level of reductions from the
62. Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord,
November 15, 2007. See http://midwesternaccord.org/
midwesterngreenhousegasreductionaccord.pdf.
63. If EPA does not allow a state implementing a regional program to use
that program to comply with section 111(d) requirements, then states
will have to adopt performance standards to comply with section
111 alongside the regional cap-and-trade programs—i.e., double
regulation.
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regulated entities that is equal to or better than that prescribed by EPA. The relevant design elements here are the
program’s scope, cap type, cap level, geopolitical boundaries, offset policies, linking, temporal flexibility (banking,
borrowing, length of compliance period), and safety valves.
Table 1 lists the design features of each regional program.
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program covers, the more opportunities it will offer for
reductions and innovation. A broad scope with a unified
carbon price also helps avoid perverse incentives to
increase emissions in a sector of the economy where
emissions are less regulated or less expensive. The net
result of a broad scope is greater reductions at a lower cost.

2. Section 111

IV. Cap and Trade under Section 111(d):
Reconciling Regional Designs with the Act
The current state-level cap-and-trade programs were
designed and implemented by the states after substantial
stakeholder input. The experience of these states and their
stakeholders has taught them important lessons on how to
reduce emissions. As a result, many states and their
stakeholders are expected to try to continue these programs
within the framework of section 111. Next we look at ways
of implementing the regional programs while meeting the
states’ obligations under section 111(d).
It is important to reemphasize that state plans under section
111(d) will have to be at least as stringent and reductions
must be accomplished at least as quickly as the federal
guideline requires. As noted above, the RGGI emissions
cap for the power sector is currently greater than the actual
emissions in the region. It is likely, therefore, that RGGI
will have to tighten its emissions cap if it is to satisfy
section 111(d) minimums. Any reductions RGGI is to
accomplish, furthermore, will have to be accomplished at
least as quickly as the federal guideline requires. Stringency and timing of reductions are perhaps the easiest
design features of existing state program to judge. Scope,
offsets, international trading and temporal compliance
flexibility present thornier challenges.

A. Scope
1. The Issue
The scopes of the regional cap-and-trade programs differ;
for example, RGGI covers only the power sector, whereas
both WCI and the Midwestern Accord cover several
sectors, to be phased in over time. In general, a broader
scope is preferable because the more sources that a

Section 111 is built around the establishment of categories
of stationary emissions sources. EPA decides on the categories, and only those categories defined under section 111(b)
by EPA are available for regulation under section 111(d).64
Although the states can petition EPA to list a new category
and, presumably, to revise the current list, EPA is the legal
authority for establishing categories.65
EPA has substantial leeway in establishing categories.
Indeed, section 111(b)(2) expressly states that EPA “may
distinguish among classes, types, and sizes within categories of new sources for the purpose of establishing such
standards.” It follows that EPA may define a category of
greenhouse gas emissions sources very broadly and allow
for different treatment of segments of that category in order
to establish new source performance standards. Such a
broad definition of the source category would make it
easier for the states to implement a broad-scope cap-andtrade program. Therefore the states could petition EPA to
draw the boundaries of section 111(b) categories so as to
make it easier for states to comply using their broad-scope
cap-and-trade programs.
In the past, emissions reductions have come from individual source categories covered by narrow standards of
performance. For example, CAMR covered only one
source category: coal- and oil-burning power plants.
Although the statute restricts section 111(d)’s authority to
only those source categories regulated under section
111(b), nothing in the statutory language expressly

64. 42 U.S.C. 7411(d)(1)(A)(ii) limits regulations to those categories of
sources to which a new source performance standard applies under
section 111(b).
65. 42 U.S.C. 7411(g).
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Table 1 | Design Features of the Three Regional Cap-and-Trade Programs
Regional
Program

Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)

Midwestern Accord

Western Climate Initiative (WCI)

Scope

Applies to emissions of CO2 from electrical
generators with capacity greater than 25
MW.

Applies to emissions of six GHGs (CO2, CH4, N2O,
HFCs, PFCs, SF6) from sources that emit more
than the equivalent of 25,000 MMT of CO2:
l Electrical generation, including imported
electricity.
l Industrial and commercial fossil fuel
combustion.
l Industrial process emissions.
l Fossil fuel suppliers, including suppliers of
transportation fuels.

Applies to emissions of seven GHGs (CO2,
CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, NF3, SF6) from sources
that emit more than the equivalent of
25,000 MMT of CO2:
Beginning in 2012 includes
l Electrical generation, including imported
electricity either directly or indirectly
through a set-aside.
l Industrial and commercial fossil fuel
combustion.
l Industrial process emissions.
Beginning in 2015 includes
l Transportation fuel suppliers.
l Residential fuel suppliers.

Cap Type

Absolute cap.

Absolute cap.

Absolute cap.

Level of Cap

Target keeps emissions levels constant
until 2014, then decreases 2.5% annually
through 2018.

Target of 18% to 20% emissions reductions from
2005 levels by 2020 and 80% reductions by
2050.

Target of 15% emissions reductions from
2005 emissions levels by 2020.

International?

No.

Yes.

Yes.

Offsets and
Linking

Offsets may constitute 3.3% to 10% of
compliance obligation, depending on price
triggers. Geographic scope initially limited
to the United States. If the stage 2 trigger
is met, then international offsets approved
under the UNFCCC may be used (i.e., CDM
& JI).

Offsets may constitute no more than 20% of
compliance obligation unless price triggers are
met. The offset limits under those circumstances
have not yet been defined. Acceptance of CDM
and JI offsets will be evaluated.

Offsets may not constitute more than 49% of
emissions reductions; however, each
jurisdiction may set a lower limit.

Banking

Allowed.

Allowed.

Allowed.

Borrowing

Not allowed.

Borrowing one to two years into future is allowed
for up to 20% of the compliance obligation. Limit
may be tightened or loosened via price triggers.
Those limits have not yet been defined.

Not allowed.

Length of
Compliance
Period

Three-year compliance period with
Three-year compliance period.
one-year extension if stage 2 trigger is met.

Price Cap/
Safety Valve/
Price Trigger

Two-stage price trigger based on
twelve-month rolling average allowance
price:
l	If price exceeds $7 (stage 1), then offset
limit will increase to 5% of allowances.
l If price exceeds $10 (stage 2), then
offset limit will increase to 10% of
allowances; compliance period will
increase to four years; and offsets from
UNFCCC-approved carbon program will
be recognized.

Three-year compliance period.

Cost-containment mechanisms are under
If allowance price exceeds upper trigger price,
development.
then borrowing and offset limits will increase.
l If allowance price falls below lower trigger price,
then borrowing and offset limits will decrease.
l If allowance price exceeds upper significant
price threshold, then allowances will be
released from strategic reserve (filled by setting
aside 2% of allowances annually).
l If price decreases below lower significant price
threshold, then allowances will be removed
from circulation and placed in strategic reserve.
l
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precludes EPA or the states from trading allowances across
different regulated categories of emissions sources.
The states may propose a plan under section 111(d) that is
equivalent to or more stringent than EPA’s guidelines. In
fact, EPA contemplated this possibility in its regulations
implementing section 111(d),66 and it is consistent with the
general reservation of the states’ authority contained in
section 116 of the Clean Air Act.67

3. Possible Solutions
The challenge of reconciling regional cap-and-trade scope
with section 111 for covered stationary sources has at least
three possible solutions.
First, EPA could draw broad categories of emissions
sources under section 111(b). One approach would be for
the agency to create a category consisting of all stationary
greenhouse gas emitters or all stationary combustion
facilities over a certain-size threshold (such as 25,000 tons
of CO2e). Although this approach would make trading
between economic sectors more consistent with the past
implementation of section 111(d) and thus less vulnerable
to legal challenge, it probably is an unlikely outcome given
EPA’s recent decision to proceed with developing standards
for the existing power plant and refineries categories. That
said, however, under this approach, the states could include
additional source categories that already are part of their
regional cap-and-trade programs, by proposing size
thresholds lower than those set by EPA, because doing so
would increase the program’s stringency as long as the rate
of reduction was the same.

66. According to 40 CFR §60.24(g), “Nothing in this subpart shall be
construed to preclude any State or political subdivision thereof from
adopting or enforcing (1) emission standards more stringent than
emission guidelines specified in subpart C of this part or in applicable
guideline documents or (2) compliance schedules requiring final
compliance at earlier times than those specified in subpart C or in
applicable guideline documents.” This is consistent with the Clean
Air Act’s broad reservation of state authority in section 116.
67. Section 116 contains a few limitations on the states’ authority to go
further than the federal requirements, most notably the “no third car”
limitation that permits only California to issue vehicle standards that
are more stringent than the federal requirements, although other states
may follow California’s lead. See 42 U.S.C. 7416.
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Second, EPA could interpret “standard of performance” to
allow a “system of emission reduction” that allows trading
across various regulated categories of emissions sources.
This approach would require EPA to first define and issue
section 111(b) standards for source categories that included
the sectors in the states’ cap-and-trade programs. For
example, EPA could establish separate standards for power
plants, refineries, chemical manufacturers, and the like.
Ideally, EPA would include this multi-sector option in the
guidelines it issues under section 111(d) and would
expressly interpret the Act to allow trading across the
different source categories in section 111.
Third, a state could propose covering in its section 111(d)
cap-and-trade program those sectors for which EPA had
issued 111(b) standards, as well as sectors for which EPA
had not issued 111(b) standards. To support this proposal,
state would likely have to demonstrate that the total
reductions achieved in each sector for which EPA had
established 111(d) guidelines would be equal to or greater
than the reductions that would be achieved without
multi-sector trading. The states also could argue that
multi-sector cap and trade was a better system of regulation
than the single-sector performance standard approach. This
argument would be relatively straightforward given the
economic literature supporting the conclusion that multisector cap and trade leads to lower costs than does a
single-sector emissions performance standard or cap and
trade.

B. Offsets
1. Issue
Project-based reductions, or offsets, are activities that take
place away from the emissions sources covered by the
cap-and-trade program. All three regional cap-and-trade
program designs include offsets. Offsets offer opportunities
for inexpensive emissions reductions, and they reduce the
cost of achieving a given level of emissions reductions.
Offsets also provide a mechanism to bring sectors into the
carbon market voluntarily. In turn, this provides access to
capital for improvements but imposes no obligation to
make those improvements, which may be desirable for

20

World Resources Institute | Columbia Law School Center for Climate Change Law | WORKING PAPER

sectors not yet deemed for direct regulation. Offset
provisions are also among the most complex features of
existing programs and the states have had limited experience in ensuring that offsets represent credible emissions
reductions.

2. Section 111
Section 111 of the Clean Air Act makes no mention of
offsets. Rather, section 111(d) standards of performance are
restricted to source categories regulated under section
111(b). It is unlikely, therefore, that offsets could be used
to meet the minimum reductions required by EPA’s
guidelines issued under section 111(d). That is, reductions
must come from the sources covered by the section 111(d)
standard of performance.

3. Possible Solution
Offsets could be used to achieve reductions above and
beyond the federal minimum set in the section 111(d)
guideline. To do this, the states would establish strict caps
limiting the use of offsets, so as to ensure that sectoral
reductions in a particular state are not undermined by
offsets in the system. States might find this to be a reasonable trade-off if they decided that they would like to
achieve reductions above and beyond those achieved by
EPA (e.g., those states with ambitious economy-wide
reduction targets) and/or if they have stakeholders very
interested in participating in the offsets market.

C. International Trading
1. Issue
Thus far, trading between jurisdictions has been an integral
part of the cap-and-trade design for air pollutants. Trading
between states with 111(d) compliant programs is relatively straightforward and should not present any challenges. But both the Midwestern Accord and the Western
Climate Initiative have Canadian members, and in such a
linked trading regime, it is impossible to predict where the
reductions will take place. That is, the location of the
reductions will be driven by market forces and will occur
wherever they are cheapest. This means that a linked

program could achieve greater emissions reductions in the
Canadian provinces than in the U.S. states (or the reverse).

2. Section 111
Section 111 says nothing about obtaining reductions from
international sources and using those reductions to offset
compliance obligations under section 111(d). The international trading issue is similar to the scope and the offsets
issue insofar as the reductions from international facilities
covered by a cap are considered to be reductions achieved
at facilities not regulated under section 111(d). Therefore, it
is unlikely that they could count toward the reductions
required by section 111(d) regulated sources. That is, these
reductions will be made outside the categories of sources
regulated under section 111.

3. Possible Solution
As with offsets, if the states can show that the allowances
provide reductions above and beyond the federally required
minimum reductions, international allowances might be
used in the state-level cap-and-trade programs under
section 111(d). Similarly, this may require the states to
show that in an internationally linked cap-and-trade
program, the reductions at the domestically located sources
within the regulated category will equal or exceed those
expected through EPA’s guideline.
The challenge here is that it is impossible to predict
certainly and precisely where market forces will drive
reductions. The states could address this issue in one of
three ways. First, they could adopt trading limits. This
approach was proposed in EPA’s Transport Rule. Second,
the states could adopt parallel source performance standards. If those standards are stringent enough to ensure that
EPA’s targets will be met, then they probably would
undermine the efficiency gains provided by market-based
cap-and-trade programs. The third and most appealing
option would be to allow states to include a program
review in their cap-and-trade rules that requires periodic
review and revisions if in-state reductions fell below those
required by NSPS. This would enable states to allow more
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flexibility in their cap-and-trade systems, but step in where
needed. This process is described in section IV.F.

4. Other Considerations: The Constitutional Issue
Another issue posed by internationally linked programs is
whether the “link” constitutes an “agreement or compact”
with a foreign power that Congress must approve under
Article I, Section 1, of the United States Constitution.
Avoiding the creation of an “agreement or compact” that
would run afoul of the U.S. Constitution is perhaps an
easier challenge to confront than section 111. First, there is
no need for any “agreement or compact” to link trading
programs. Instead, the trading programs could be linked
through the unilateral recognition of one system’s allowances by another system. For example, the province of
Quebec could allow its sources to supply RGGI allowances
for compliance purposes. Because Quebec entities may
obtain those allowances on the open market, there is no
need for involvement by the U.S. state entity. Similarly, the
U.S. states could unilaterally recognize the allowances of a
Canadian province without the need for an agreement.
Each RGGI state allows its sources to use other states’
allowances for compliance. There is no binding agreement
that requires states to accept one another’s allowances, and
no penalties can be assessed against a member state if it
leaves the program. The risk that a member state’s jurisdiction would leave is low, however, since it would create
havoc for those of its regulated entities that invested in
allowances and emissions abatement. The member state
also would likely have a mixture of allowances from other
states and would have no guarantee that the other states
would take them back after its jurisdiction pulled out.
Put in another way, these arrangements probably do not
violate international law because they do not constitute
binding agreements on both parties: the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties recognizes as treaties only those
instruments that impose actual obligations: “Every treaty in
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force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them.”68 WCI does not require this commitment,
and so it does not count as a treaty and is not precluded
under international law. Instead, the question is whether the
domestic constitutions allow such state actions.69 In the
United States, the states are generally allowed to enter into
compacts or agreements only with the consent of Congress.70 The Supreme Court has held, however, that interstate compacts do not require congressional consent so long
as they do not “increase . . . political power in the States,
which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.”71 In recent academic and judicial
activity, this ruling has been expanded to apply to foreign
relations: “agreements involving local transborder issues,
such as agreements to curb a source of pollution . . . have
been considered not to require Congressional consent.”72
In this context, it seems likely that a voluntary international
compact between subnational entities to coordinate in
reducing greenhouse gases would constitute an agreement
“to curb a source of pollution” that has been upheld, even
in the absence of congressional approval.

68. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S 331, Art. 26.
69. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties,
in United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First and
Second Sessions, Vienna, 26 March– 24 May 1968 and 9 April–22
May 1969, Art. 5(2).
70. Raymond S. Rodgers, The Capacity of States of the Union to
Conclude International Agreements: The Background and Some
Recent Developments, American Journal of International Law 61
(1967):1021.
71. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism,
Michigan Law Review 97 (1998):390, 461 (quoting Virginia v.
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893)).
72. Restatement (Third), see 42 U.S.C. section 4211(b), § 302. There also
are cases that have approved certain compacts or agreements between
subnational entities and foreign entities without congressional
approval. For example,, see In re Manuel P., 263 Cal. Rptr. 447, 459
(1989) (allowing San Diego agreement to share juvenile offenders’
information with Mexico); McHenry County v. Brady, 163 N.W. 540,
544–47 (N.D. 1917) (confirming the legality of a county agreement
with a Canadian town to build a drainage ditch).
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D. Borrowing, Banking, and Compliance Periods
1. Issue
All three regional programs provide for the unlimited
banking of allowances and a three-year compliance period.
Under the Midwestern Accord, allowances may be borrowed from future compliance periods. In addition, greater
flexibility in the timing of the reductions can make the
program more efficient, allowing for greater reductions at a
lower cost. This holds as long as the temporal flexibility
does not jeopardize the program’s integrity. The reason is
that these temporal flexibility mechanisms make it less
certain that the emissions reductions from the cap-andtrade program will be equal to or greater than the federal
minimum in any given year.

2. Section 111
Section 111 also says nothing about the use of mechanisms
that might have the effect of front-loading or deferring
emissions reductions. The EPA regulations implementing
section 111(d) do, however, refer to “compliance times,”
stating that compliance times in a state plan to cover
existing sources must be no later than those contained in
the federal guideline.73
EPA’s design choices provide some indication of the design
choices that it believed were appropriate in this context.
For example, the CAMR cap-and-trade program included
unlimited banking, and EPA also proposed a borrowing
mechanism tied to an allowance trigger price. When the
allowance prices rose to the trigger, the mechanism would
allow the compliance entities to buy allowances for future
compliance periods, that is, borrow allowances from the
future to reduce the price of allowances in the present.
Although EPA ultimately did not include this borrowing
mechanism in the final CAMR rule, it nevertheless
concluded that it did have the authority to include such a
mechanism in the preamble to the final CAMR rule.74

3. Possible Solutions
The fact that EPA included unlimited banking in the
CAMR cap-and-trade rule suggests it believes that banking
is permitted under section 111(d). This makes sense, for the
states are required to achieve reductions no later than the
federal program would have, so advance compliance
should not be a problem here.
Nonetheless, although banking encourages over-compliance
in the early years, borrowing enables regulated entities to
delay compliance. Borrowing is a feature limited to the
Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, although
the multi-year compliance periods in all three regional
programs could be regarded as providing limited borrowing
within the time period covered by the compliance period.
The borrowing provisions in the Midwestern Accord require
the “payment” of interest on borrowed allowances. Therefore, while borrowing does delay compliance, it also can
lead to greater reductions in later years as long as its use is
limited. If there is too much borrowing, the higher reductions
required in future years could drive up allowance prices in a
way that would change the nature of the program. Specifically, the Midwestern Accord, however, contains embedded
price triggers that, if reached, would lead to a reduction in
the interest rate, the expanded use of offsets, and possibly a
release of allowances from the strategic reserve.
One solution to this challenge is that in its guideline under
section 111(d), EPA could specify that its interpretation of
the statute allows multi-year compliance periods, banking,
and limited borrowing. The guideline also could clarify any
constraints that the agency believes are necessary to impose
on borrowing allowances. Such provisions are consistent
with EPA’s approach in the proposed CAMR rule.75

E. Cost-Containment Mechanisms
1. Issue
All three regional programs have some form of cost-containment mechanism designed to hold down prices deemed
to be too high while at the same time preserving the

73. 40 CFR §60.24(c).
74. 70 Fed. Reg. 28606, 28630 (May 18, 2005).

75. Ibid.
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program’s emissions reduction goals. This is done through
allowance price triggers that modify features such as limits
on offsets, length of compliance period, and borrowing or,
for the Midwestern Accord, by releasing allowances from a
strategic reserve filled with allowances set aside from the
cap. This mechanism permits the states to have a more
ambitious program design than they could have without
these provisions.
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greenhouse gases. But if a state were experiencing longterm price inflation and were continuing to rely on costcontainment provisions, EPA could decide whether the
state’s particular cap-and-trade program was, in fact, the
best system of compliance and thus whether certain design
elements were preventing the state from reaching the
appropriate level of reductions.

F. Process
2. Section 111
The framework of section 111(d) suggests that the given
reductions must take place in the relevant sector. Although
section 111(d) does not specify the timing of those reductions—other than the requirement that EPA revise the new
source performance standards every eight years—EPA has
included the concept of “compliance times” in the rules
implementing section 111(d). Thus, 40 CFR section
60.24(c) requires that the compliance times proposed by
the states in their plans to implement 111(d) must achieve
the reductions at least as soon as the federal guidelines
would achieve them.

3. Possible Solutions
States will need to demonstrate that their cost-containment
mechanisms will not prevent achievement of the emissions
reductions requirements, and thus do not undermine the
emissions cap. When deciding where to set the emissions
standard, EPA must “take into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair quality health and
environmental impact and energy requirements.” Accordingly, the determination of what costs are reasonable and
what are excessive is firmly embedded in section 111. If a
state can show that its price triggers will take effect only at
prices at or above those that EPA already has determined to
be unreasonable, it will have a strong case that those
triggers are consistent with the statute. This reading also is
consistent with the proposed safety valve provision in the
proposed CAMR rule.76 Although EPA decided that the
safety valve mechanism was not necessary to control costs
in the CAMR rule, it could reach a different conclusion for

76. Ibid.

The states could make the case for these design features
when making their submission under section 111(d). The
preferable way, however, for states to implement cap-andtrade programs with these design elements would be for
EPA to explicitly allow these features in its guidelines. This
would clarify the process for the states and permit the more
targeted engagement of stakeholders as well as the more
rapid adoption of emissions standards.
If a state’s adoption of certain design features requires a
periodic review to ensure that they do not violate the
requirements of section 111, the state’s mechanism for
periodic review must necessarily include automatic
adjustments to ensure that the minimum federal reductions
are achieved.

V. If EPA Fails to Act: The Right to Petition
under Section 111(g)
EPA has announced that it is moving forward with greenhouse gas standards of performance for power plants and
refineries. If EPA fails to act on any of the other categories
of sources, state governors have the authority under section
111(g) to petition EPA to force it to act. Under section
111(g), a state may argue that EPA should have included a
category of sources that was not included or that standards
of performance should have been issued for a specific
pollutant for an already listed category of sources.
EPA has significant discretion in how it pursues regulation
under section 111. Although many categories of stationary
greenhouse gas emitters already have been listed among
the source categories triggering the section 111(b) endan-
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germent finding, the statute expressly provides that EPA
may distinguish among subcategories, classes, or types of
sources within each category. This indicates that the agency
has broad discretion in regulating a category once it has
been listed. This discretion notwithstanding, governors
have the right to question EPA’s decision not to list a
particular category or not to promulgate emissions standards.

Box 6 | Section 111(g) Revision of regulations

(1) Upon application by the Governor of a State showing
that the Administrator has failed to specify in regulations
under subsection (f)(1) of this section any category of
major stationary sources required to be specified under
such regulations, the Administrator shall revise such
regulations to specify any such category.
(2) Upon application of the Governor of a State, showing
that any category of stationary sources which is not
included in the list under subsection (b)(1)(A) of this
section contributes significantly to air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare (notwithstanding that such category is not a
category of major stationary sources), the Administrator
shall revise such regulations to specify such category of
stationary sources.

Several issues will arise if EPA chooses not to act but the
state’s petitions under 111(g) are successful. Nonetheless,
l

A reluctant EPA will be slower to act, and court proceedings will require time to achieve a result.

l

Because the use of cap and trade under section 111 is not
yet settled law, which cap-and-trade design elements will
be allowed is uncertain. Given that the courts will give
deference to EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act,
EPA can help those states pursuing cap and trade by
interpreting the Clean Air Act in a way consistent with
the states’ proposed plans under section 111(d).

VI. Conclusion: A Potential Path Forward
for the States and EPA
EPA has announced that it will begin regulating power
plants and refineries under section 111 of the Clean Air
Act. The agency will issue final mandatory guidelines to
the states for power plants in May 2012 and for refineries
in November 2012. The states then will be required to
submit a plan to regulate existing power plants and
refineries to EPA for approval. After lengthy processes that
included their key stakeholders, many states already
designed and implemented cap-and-trade programs to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from existing power
plants and other facilities.
A number of states have already begun asking EPA to have
their current programs qualify under section 111 of the Act.
Those states proposing to implement cap and trade under
section 111(d) are likely to be able to do so given the
flexibility inherent in the Clean Air Act. EPA has an

important oversight role and will decide what types of
regulatory mechanisms will be listed in the federal guidelines and/or approved in the state plans under section
111(d). Courts are likely to give EPA’s interpretation of the
statute deference, because the Act is mostly silent or at
least ambiguous on cap-and-trade design questions.
When states propose using their cap-and-trade programs
for compliance with EPA’s guidelines under section 111(d),
the following considerations will be important:
l

The states’ case will be bolstered if EPA expressly lists
emissions trading as a demonstrated “system of emission
reduction” when it issues its mandatory guidelines under
section 111(d).

l

If EPA’s focus in determining whether a state’s plan is as
stringent as the federal guidelines is on emissions
reductions, then certain features of state cap-and-trade
programs are more likely to pass muster, such as trading
across sectors and international linking. If a state’s
proposed plan would reduce emissions by as many or
more tons as the federal guidelines would, then the plan
should be regarded as having equal or greater stringency.
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l

EPA could interpret the provisions of section 111(d) and
its implementing regulations to allow for flexibility when
that flexibility reduces costs while preserving the
program’s environmental integrity. This flexibility could
include temporal flexibility, international trading, price
triggers, and limited offsets.

In the past, both EPA and the states have implemented
section 111 by establishing source-specific emissions
standards, thereby making it a legally “safe” path forward.
But given the years of engagement with stakeholders and
the time and effort spent designing successful cap-andtrade mechanisms, many states can be expected to want to
follow a different path and to use these emissions trading
programs to meet federal requirements and, in some cases,
to go beyond those requirements. Our analysis suggests
that this should be permitted under section 111 of the Clean
Air Act.
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APPENDIX A

(A) a technological process for production or
operation by any source which is inherently
low-polluting or nonpolluting, or

Full Text of Section 111 of the Clean Air Act
§ 7411. Standards of performance for new stationary
sources

(B) a technological system for continuous reduction of the pollution generated by a source before
such pollution is emitted into the ambient air,
including precombustion cleaning or treatment of
fuels.

(a) Definitions
For purposes of this section:
(1) The term “standard of performance” means a
standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects
the degree of emission limitation achievable through
the application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving
such reduction and any nonair quality health and
environmental impact and energy requirements) the
Administrator determines has been adequately
demonstrated.
(2) The term “new source” means any stationary
source, the construction or modification of which is
commenced after the publication of regulations (or, if
earlier, proposed regulations) prescribing a standard of
performance under this section which will be applicable to such source.
(3) The term “stationary source” means any building,
structure, facility, or installation which emits or may
emit any air pollutant. Nothing in subchapter II of this
chapter relating to nonroad engines shall be construed
to apply to stationary internal combustion engines.
(4) The term “modification” means any physical
change in, or change in the method of operation of, a
stationary source which increases the amount of any
air pollutant emitted by such source or which results in
the emission of any air pollutant not previously
emitted.
(5) The term “owner or operator” means any person
who owns, leases, operates, controls, or supervises a
stationary source.
(6) The term “existing source” means any stationary
source other than a new source.
(7) The term “technological system of continuous
emission reduction” means—

(8) A conversion to coal
(A) by reason of an order under section 2(a) of the
Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination
Act of 1974 [15 U.S.C. 792(a)] or any amendment
thereto, or any subsequent enactment which
supersedes such Act [15 U.S.C. 791 et seq.], or
(B) which qualifies under section 7413 (d)(5)(A)
(ii) [1] of this title, shall not be deemed to be a
modification for purposes of paragraphs (2) and (4)
of this subsection.

(b) List of categories of stationary sources; standards of
performance; information on pollution control techniques;
sources owned or operated by United States; particular
systems; revised standards
(1)
(A) The Administrator shall, within 90 days after
December 31, 1970, publish (and from time to time
thereafter shall revise) a list of categories of
stationary sources. He shall include a category of
sources in such list if in his judgment it causes, or
contributes significantly to, air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare.
(B) Within one year after the inclusion of a
category of stationary sources in a list under
subparagraph (A), the Administrator shall publish
proposed regulations, establishing Federal standards of performance for new sources within such
category. The Administrator shall afford interested
persons an opportunity for written comment on
such proposed regulations. After considering such
comments, he shall promulgate, within one year
after such publication, such standards with such
modifications as he deems appropriate. The
Administrator shall, at least every 8 years, review
and, if appropriate, revise such standards following
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the procedure required by this subsection for
promulgation of such standards. Notwithstanding
the requirements of the previous sentence, the
Administrator need not review any such standard if
the Administrator determines that such review is
not appropriate in light of readily available
information on the efficacy of such standard.
Standards of performance or revisions thereof shall
become effective upon promulgation. When
implementation and enforcement of any requirement of this chapter indicate that emission limitations and percent reductions beyond those required
by the standards promulgated under this section are
achieved in practice, the Administrator shall, when
revising standards promulgated under this section,
consider the emission limitations and percent
reductions achieved in practice.
(2) The Administrator may distinguish among classes,
types, and sizes within categories of new sources for
the purpose of establishing such standards.
(3) The Administrator shall, from time to time, issue
information on pollution control techniques for
categories of new sources and air pollutants subject to
the provisions of this section.
(4) The provisions of this section shall apply to any
new source owned or operated by the United States.
(5) Except as otherwise authorized under subsection
(h) of this section, nothing in this section shall be
construed to require, or to authorize the Administrator
to require, any new or modified source to install and
operate any particular technological system of
continuous emission reduction to comply with any
new source standard of performance.
(6) The revised standards of performance required by
enactment of subsection (a)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) [1] of this
section shall be promulgated not later than one year
after August 7, 1977. Any new or modified fossil fuel
fired stationary source which commences construction
prior to the date of publication of the proposed revised
standards shall not be required to comply with such
revised standards.
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(c) State implementation and enforcement of standards of
performance
(1) Each State may develop and submit to the Administrator a procedure for implementing and enforcing
standards of performance for new sources located in
such State. If the Administrator finds the State procedure is adequate, he shall delegate to such State any
authority he has under this chapter to implement and
enforce such standards.
(2) Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit the
Administrator from enforcing any applicable standard
of performance under this section.

(d) Standards of performance for existing sources;
remaining useful life of source
(1) The Administrator shall prescribe regulations
which shall establish a procedure similar to that
provided by section 7410 of this title under which each
State shall submit to the Administrator a plan which
(A) establishes standards of performance for any
existing source for any air pollutant
(i) for which air quality criteria have not been
issued or which is not included on a list
published under section 7408 (a) of this title or
emitted from a source category which is
regulated under section 7412 of this title but
(ii) to which a standard of performance under
this section would apply if such existing source
were a new source, and
(B) provides for the implementation and enforcement of such standards of performance. Regulations of the Administrator under this paragraph
shall permit the State in applying a standard of
performance to any particular source under a plan
submitted under this paragraph to take into
consideration, among other factors, the remaining
useful life of the existing source to which such
standard applies.
(2) The Administrator shall have the same authority—
(A) to prescribe a plan for a State in cases where
the State fails to submit a satisfactory plan as he
would have under section7410 (c) of this title in the
case of failure to submit an implementation plan,
and
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(B) to enforce the provisions of such plan in cases
where the State fails to enforce them as he would
have under sections 7413 and 7414 of this title with
respect to an implementation plan. In promulgating
a standard of performance under a plan prescribed
under this paragraph, the Administrator shall take
into consideration, among other factors, remaining
useful lives of the sources in the category of
sources to which such standard applies.

(e) Prohibited acts
After the effective date of standards of performance
promulgated under this section, it shall be unlawful for any
owner or operator of any new source to operate such
source in violation of any standard of performance applicable to such source.

(f) New source standards of performance
(1) For those categories of major stationary sources
that the Administrator listed under subsection (b)(1)
(A) of this section before November 15, 1990, and for
which regulations had not been proposed by the
Administrator by November 15, 1990, the Administrator shall—
(A) propose regulations establishing standards of
performance for at least 25 percent of such
categories of sources within 2 years after November 15, 1990;
(B) propose regulations establishing standards of
performance for at least 50 percent of such
categories of sources within 4 years after November 15, 1990; and
(C) propose regulations for the remaining categories of sources within 6 years after November 15,
1990.
(2) In determining priorities for promulgating standards for categories of major stationary sources for the
purpose of paragraph (1), the Administrator shall
consider—
(A) the quantity of air pollutant emissions which
each such category will emit, or will be designed to
emit;
(B) the extent to which each such pollutant may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare; and

(C) the mobility and competitive nature of each
such category of sources and the consequent need
for nationally applicable new source standards of
performance.
(3) Before promulgating any regulations under this
subsection or listing any category of major stationary
sources as required under this subsection, the Administrator shall consult with appropriate representatives of
the Governors and of State air pollution control
agencies.

(g) Revision of regulations
(1) Upon application by the Governor of a State
showing that the Administrator has failed to specify in
regulations under subsection(f)(1) of this section any
category of major stationary sources required to be
specified under such regulations, the Administrator
shall revise such regulations to specify any such
category.
(2) Upon application of the Governor of a State,
showing that any category of stationary sources which
is not included in the list under subsection (b)(1)(A) of
this section contributes significantly to air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare (notwithstanding that such
category is not a category of major stationary sources),
the Administrator shall revise such regulations to
specify such category of stationary sources.
(3) Upon application of the Governor of a State
showing that the Administrator has failed to apply
properly the criteria required to be considered under
subsection (f)(2) of this section, the Administrator
shall revise the list under subsection (b)(1)(A) of this
section to apply properly such criteria.
(4) Upon application of the Governor of a State
showing that—
(A) a new, innovative, or improved technology or
process which achieves greater continuous emission reduction has been adequately demonstrated
for any category of stationary sources, and
(B) as a result of such technology or process, the
new source standard of performance in effect under
this section for such category no longer reflects the
greatest degree of emission limitation achievable
through application of the best technological
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system of continuous emission reduction which
(taking into consideration the cost of achieving
such emission reduction, and any non-air quality
health and environmental impact and energy
requirements) has been adequately demonstrated,
the Administrator shall revise such standard of
performance for such category accordingly.
(5) Unless later deadlines for action of the Administrator are otherwise prescribed under this section, the
Administrator shall, not later than three months
following the date of receipt of any application by a
Governor of a State, either—
(A) find that such application does not contain the
requisite showing and deny such application, or
(B) grant such application and take the action
required under this subsection.
(6) Before taking any action required by subsection (f)
of this section or by this subsection, the Administrator
shall provide notice and opportunity for public
hearing.

(h) Design, equipment, work practice, or operational
standard; alternative emission limitation
(1) For purposes of this section, if in the judgment of
the Administrator, it is not feasible to prescribe or
enforce a standard of performance, he may instead
promulgate a design, equipment, work practice, or
operational standard, or combination thereof, which
reflects the best technological system of continuous
emission reduction which (taking into consideration
the cost of achieving such emission reduction, and any
non-air quality health and environmental impact and
energy requirements) the Administrator determines has
been adequately demonstrated. In the event the
Administrator promulgates a design or equipment
standard under this subsection, he shall include as part
of such standard such requirements as will assure the
proper operation and maintenance of any such element
of design or equipment.
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the phrase “not
feasible to prescribe or enforce a standard of performance” means any situation in which the Administrator determines that
(A) a pollutant or pollutants cannot be emitted
through a conveyance designed and constructed to
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emit or capture such pollutant, or that any requirement for, or use of, such a conveyance would be
inconsistent with any Federal, State, or local law,
or
(B) the application of measurement methodology
to a particular class of sources is not practicable
due to technological or economic limitations.
(3) If after notice and opportunity for public hearing,
any person establishes to the satisfaction of the
Administrator that an alternative means of emission
limitation will achieve a reduction in emissions of any
air pollutant at least equivalent to the reduction in
emissions of such air pollutant achieved under the
requirements of paragraph (1), the Administrator shall
permit the use of such alternative by the source for
purposes of compliance with this section with respect
to such pollutant.
(4) Any standard promulgated under paragraph (1)
shall be promulgated in terms of standard of performance whenever it becomes feasible to promulgate
and enforce such standard in such terms.
(5) Any design, equipment, work practice, or operational standard, or any combination thereof, described
in this subsection shall be treated as a standard of
performance for purposes of the provisions of this
chapter (other than the provisions of subsection (a) of
this section and this subsection).

(i) Country elevators
Any regulations promulgated by the Administrator under
this section applicable to grain elevators shall not apply to
country elevators (as defined by the Administrator) which
have a storage capacity of less than two million five
hundred thousand bushels.

(j) Innovative technological systems of continuous emission reduction
(1)
(A) Any person proposing to own or operate a new
source may request the Administrator for one or
more waivers from the requirements of this section
for such source or any portion thereof with respect
to any air pollutant to encourage the use of an
innovative technological system or systems of
continuous emission reduction. The Administrator
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may, with the consent of the Governor of the State
in which the source is to be located, grant a waiver
under this paragraph, if the Administrator determines after notice and opportunity for public
hearing, that—

include a requirement for prompt reporting of the
emission of any unregulated pollutant from a
system if such pollutant was not emitted, or was
emitted in significantly lesser amounts without use
of such system.

(i) the proposed system or systems have not
been adequately demonstrated,

(B) A waiver under this paragraph shall be granted
on such terms and conditions as the Administrator
determines to be necessary to assure—

(ii) the proposed system or systems will operate
effectively and there is a substantial likelihood
that such system or systems will achieve greater
continuous emission reduction than that
required to be achieved under the standards of
performance which would otherwise apply, or
achieve at least an equivalent reduction at lower
cost in terms of energy, economic, or nonair
quality environmental impact,
(iii) the owner or operator of the proposed
source has demonstrated to the satisfaction of
the Administrator that the proposed system will
not cause or contribute to an unreasonable risk
to public health, welfare, or safety in its
operation, function, or malfunction, and
(iv) the granting of such waiver is consistent
with the requirements of subparagraph (C).
In making any determination under clause (ii), the
Administrator shall take into account any previous
failure of such system or systems to operate
effectively or to meet any requirement of the new
source performance standards. In determining
whether an unreasonable risk exists under clause
(iii), the Administrator shall consider, among other
factors, whether and to what extent the use of the
proposed technological system will cause, increase,
reduce, or eliminate emissions of any unregulated
pollutants; available methods for reducing or
eliminating any risk to public health, welfare, or
safety which may be associated with the use of
such system; and the availability of other technological systems which may be used to conform to
standards under this section without causing or
contributing to such unreasonable risk. The
Administrator may conduct such tests and may
require the owner or operator of the proposed
source to conduct such tests and provide such
information as is necessary to carry out clause (iii)
of this subparagraph. Such requirements shall

(i) emissions from the source will not prevent
attainment and maintenance of any national
ambient air quality standards, and
(ii) proper functioning of the technological
system or systems authorized. Any such term or
condition shall be treated as a standard of
performance for the purposes of subsection (e)
of this section and section 7413 of this title.
(C) The number of waivers granted under this
paragraph with respect to a proposed technological
system of continuous emission reduction shall not
exceed such number as the Administrator finds
necessary to ascertain whether or not such system
will achieve the conditions specified in clauses (ii)
and (iii) of subparagraph (A).
(D) A waiver under this paragraph shall extend to
the sooner of—
(i) the date determined by the Administrator,
after consultation with the owner or operator of
the source, taking into consideration the design,
installation, and capital cost of the technological
system or systems being used, or
(ii) the date on which the Administrator
determines that such system has failed to—
(I) achieve at least an equivalent continuous
emission reduction to that required to be
achieved under the standards of performance
which would otherwise apply, or
(II) comply with the condition specified in
paragraph (1)(A)(iii), and that such failure
cannot be corrected.
(E) In carrying out subparagraph (D)(i), the Administrator shall not permit any waiver for a source or
portion thereof to extend beyond the date—
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(i) seven years after the date on which any
waiver is granted to such source or portion
thereof, or
(ii) four years after the date on which such
source or portion thereof commences operation,
whichever is earlier.
(F) No waiver under this subsection shall apply to
any portion of a source other than the portion on
which the innovative technological system or
systems of continuous emission reduction is used.
(2)
(A) If a waiver under paragraph (1) is terminated
under clause (ii) of paragraph (1)(D), the Administrator shall grant an extension of the requirements
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of this section for such source for such minimum
period as may be necessary to comply with the
applicable standard of performance under this
section. Such period shall not extend beyond the
date three years from the time such waiver is
terminated.
(B) An extension granted under this paragraph shall
set forth emission limits and a compliance schedule
containing increments of progress which require
compliance with the applicable standards of
performance as expeditiously as practicable and
include such measures as are necessary and
practicable in the interim to minimize emissions.
Such schedule shall be treated as a standard of
performance for purposes of subsection (e) of this
section and section 7413 of this title.
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